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1 Introduction
A publicly financed education system redistributes educational resources from rich
to poor households through taxes and aims to provide equal opportunity for children
to receive schooling regardless of their family background. One of the main concerns
is whether or not this egalitarian education policy causes a serious trade-off between
efficiency and equity. The literature on the economics of education points out several
mechanisms through which the public education system increases or decreases gross
domestic product (GDP), and provides useful insights for understanding when and
how the trade-off emerges.
On the one hand, it is common in the literature to assume declining marginal re-
turns to educational investment, which favors a publicly financed system (e.g., Loury
1981, Glomm and Ravikumar 1992, Bénabou 1996, 2002, Fernández and Rogerson
1998, and Takii and Tanaka 2009).1 If the marginal returns from investment in
human capital decline as agents spend more resources on education, the public sys-
tem can increase the total amount of human capital in an economy, and therefore
GDP, by equalizing educational opportunities because the poor’s marginal returns to
investment are higher than those of the rich.2
On the other hand, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Takii and Tanaka (2009)
point out that there are disadvantages of a publicly financed education system in
1To give a public education system the role of equalizing educational opportunities, it is also
common to assume there is a liquidity constraint or that parents have warm-glow altruism and pa-
ternalistic altruism so that education can be treated as a consumption good as well as an investment
good.
2This mechanism is fairly strong. Takii and Tanaka (2009) show that when the intergenerational
income elasticity is less than one, a public system with equal provision of resources to students yields
higher GDP than a private system, even if the aggregate production function is convex in individual
skill.
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comparison with a privately financed education system. Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992) show that the private system can generate higher GDP than the public system
if a child can choose to exert effort in the accumulation of human capital. Takii and
Tanaka (2009) find that if private schools are better able to screen students based on
their ability than public schools, there is a production structure in which the private
system attains higher GDP than the public system.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to these discussions by highlighting
an important function of education policy neglected in the literature: it affects the
distribution of educated people and thus the magnitude of gains from job assignment
in the labor market. Without exception, the existing literature assumes that there is
an aggregated measure of human capital that summarizes all the impacts of individual
human capital accumulation on GDP. We argue that this assumption masks how an
education policy influences the gains from assignment.
To highlight the novel role of an education policy, we incorporate a standard pos-
itive assortative assignment model based on Sattinger (1979) into an overlapping-
generations model with human capital accumulation through tax-financed public
schooling or tuition-financed private schooling, abstracting away the effects of ef-
fort level and ability tracking on the accumulation of human capital. Under this
setup, the public system always yields higher GDP than a private education system
if there is no assignment problem in the labor market. It is shown that a private sys-
tem can attain higher GDP because it increases productivity gains from assignment
by increasing the availability of highly educated people.
We emphasize the importance of three distinctive assumptions behind the positive
assortative assignment model, which are essential to understanding this result. The
first assumption is that the quality and the quantity of workers are not perfect substi-
tutes.3 When the quality of workers can be substituted by the quantity of workers,
3Sattinger (1980) discusses convincingly the importance of imperfect substitution between the
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the returns from employing doubly productive workers are equivalent to those from
doubling the number of workers regardless of the structure of the industry and firm.
In this case, the total productivity of the economy is influenced only by the total
amount of human capital. However, when the quantity and quality of workers are
not perfect substitutes, a firm may seek a highly talented expert rather than a large
number of ordinary workers. If there is no expert in an economy, the firm will incur
a huge loss. An education policy changes the availability of qualified workers, so it
can influence not only the total productive capacity of workers but also the pattern
of assignment between skill and productive job opportunities.
The second assumption is that job opportunities are heterogeneous.4 Without
heterogeneity among jobs, there are no gains from assignment that may potentially
provide advantages to a private education system. Among the papers on the com-
parison between public and private education systems, Bénabou (1996) and Takii and
Tanaka (2009) analyze models in which the quality and quantity of human capital
are not perfect substitutes. However, as they do not have any variation in jobs, their
measures of aggregate human capital summarize all the impacts of individual human
capital accumulation on GDP.
The third assumption is that jobs that are more productive demand more skill.
That is, job-specific productivity is complementary to skill. With this complemen-
quality and quantity of workers for assignment. The importance of the imperfect substitution
between skilled workers and unskilled workers can also be understood from the arguments regarding
skill-biased technological change (e.g., Katz and Murphy 1992).
4Considerable evidence suggests that job opportunities are heterogeneous. For example, the
literature finds that there are substantial and persistent differences in productivity between plants
and between firms (e.g., Baily, Hulten and Campbell 1992). Researchers also find that the observed
and unobserved characteristics of a firm influence wage payments after controlling for the individual
effect using matched employer—employee data (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1999).
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tarity, it is well known that talented workers are assigned to productive jobs.5 Hence,
the existence of a few highly skilled workers causes disproportional impacts on ag-
gregate productivity compared with that of ordinary workers because they are not
only productive, but can also utilize their skill to succeed in highly productive jobs.
Hence, the aggregate productivity might be larger by educating a few highly skilled
workers rather than a large number of reasonably trained workers. This mechanism
provides a novel channel, through which the private system increases GDP.
This paper shows that, in the short run, an increase in the variations in produc-
tivity across jobs (in the sense of mean preserving spread) increases the productivity
gains from a private education system more than those from a public education sys-
tem. Because of the complementarity between the productivity of jobs and skill, the
existence of highly productive job opportunities significantly increases the marginal
5There is plenty of suggestive evidence showing that more productive jobs demand more skill and
that there is positive assortative matching in the labor market. For example, evidence shows that
new technologies are skill biased, which means that advanced technologies demand more skill (e.g.,
Krusell et al. 2000). Other factors also demand high levels of skill. Chandler (1977) demonstrates
that the modern organizational structure demands skilled workers to process information. Bresna-
han, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) also show that reorganization accommodated by IT investment
demands more skilled workers. More directly, using a model similar to this paper, Takii (2008)
shows that the assumption of complementarity between firm-specific productivity and skill is con-
sistent with observed persistent productivity differences across firms. Recently, researchers have
tried to find more direct evidence using matched employer—employee data. Although controversial
evidence is found by some researchers (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 1999), other researchers
criticize the identification strategy used by these authors (e.g., Eeckhout and Kircher (2009)) and
develop more sophisticated methods to examine empirically the positive assortative matching hy-
pothesis in a labor market. Among them, Mendes, Van den Berg and Lindeboom (2007) and Lopes
de Melo (2008) provide evidence based on their methods that supports a positive assortative match-
ing hypothesis. At least, there is no evidence against a positive assortative matching hypothesis if
observable characteristics are not controlled for, which is more relevant in this paper.
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product of skill. Hence, an increase in the availability of highly skilled workers im-
proves aggregate productivity. As the private education system can produce more
highly qualified workers than the public system, an increase in the variations in pro-
ductivity increases the relative advantage of private education.
This result may not be true in the long run. As the large productivity differences
bring better opportunities for advantaged people, it increases income inequality in
the long run, which may make income transfer by a public education system more
attractive. Nonetheless, it is shown that the private system generates higher long-run
GDP than the public system does if jobs have sufficient variations in productivity.
Hence, if jobs have large variations in their productivity, a serious efficiency—equity
trade-off may occur even in the long run.
As well as contributing to the literature on the comparison of education systems,
this paper also contributes to the literature of positive assortative assignment mod-
els. Positive assortative assignment models have a long history (e.g., Becker 1973,
Sattinger 1979, and Kremer 1993 ). However, these papers typically assume the
existence of exogenous distributions of assigned variables. More recently, researchers
have started to endogenize the distribution (e.g., Acemoglu 1997, Jovanovic 1998,
2009 and Takii 2008). In particular, similarly to this paper, Acemoglu (1997) and
Jovanovic (1998, 2009) endogenize the distribution of skill. However, no paper ana-
lyzes how an education policy influences the gains from assignment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Sections 3 and 4 compare the two education systems in the short run and in the long
run, respectively. Section 5 discusses some extensions and concludes.
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2 The Model
In this section, we incorporate positive assortative job assignment between job-
specific productivity and the human capital of workers into a standard overlapping-
generations model with an educational choice. We first describe the production side
and solve the static equilibrium, and then model the investment in human capital.
Static Equilibrium: Our static assignment model is a standard one, which was
originally analyzed by Sattinger (1979). The labor market of the economy is repre-
sented by a continuum of workers and jobs in each period. Although this paper calls
a unit of production “a job”, a job can alternatively be interpreted as a firm with one
unit mass of workers.
The populations of both jobs and workers are normalized to one. Each job consists
of job-specific productivity6, z, the logarithm of which is normally distributed with
mean µz and variance σ
2
z : ln z ∼ N(µz,σ2z). The distribution of z is assumed to be
constant over time. We interpret a large z as a result of large fixed specific resources
that workers can use to make the job productive. Hence, the variance of ln z, σ2z,
can be interpreted as the variability of job opportunities.
Each worker is characterized by his/her human capital, ht, which is also log-
normally distributed: lnht ∼ N(µh,t,σ2h,t). Note that the distribution of lnht is a
function of time, t. We endogenize this distribution later.
Assume that a job with productivity z employs one worker with human capital
ht, and produces y(z) by a production function, y(z) = zhυt ,where υ > 0. This
production function exhibits the complementarity between z and ht. For a simple
6Sattinger (1979, 1980) interprets his model as positive assortative matching between the skill of
workers and a firm’s real physical capital.
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explanation, we assume that jobs are perfect substitutes in a firm. In this case,
the firm’s profit maximization problem is equivalent to the job’s profit maximization
problem. As discussed later, this assumption can be relaxed without any changes in
our result. The job chooses the human capital of a worker to maximize the profit:
χt (z) = argmax
ht
{zhυt − wt (ht)} , (1)
where wt (h) is the wage payment for the workers with h at date t. Note that the
job determines the quality of workers but not the quantity. This means that the
quantity of workers cannot be substituted for the quality. This is the assumption
that deviates from standard human capital theory.
As the production function exhibits complementarity between job opportunities
and skill, it is well known that job matching is positively assortative (e.g., Becker
1973). We characterize a positive assortative matching equilibrium. Let Φ(•) denote
a standard normal distribution. Because ln z ∼ N(µz,σ2z) and lnht ∼ N(µh,t,σ2h,t), a
positive assortative equilibrium implies that:
1− Φ
µ
ln z − µz
σz
¶
= 1− Φ
µ
lnχt (z)− µh,t
σh,t
¶
, for all z ≥ 0. (2)
This equation means that a job in the top x percentile of z must select a worker in
the top x percentile of h. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that jobs and workers
have a reservation wage and profit of zero, respectively. As the number of jobs is
equal to the number of workers, nobody chooses the outside option and every agent
can find a partner. Hence, a static equilibrium is fully characterized by χt (·) and
wt (·) satisfying equations (1) and (2).
Because the function χt (·) must satisfy the equation (2),
lnχ−1t (ht) =
σz
¡
lnht − µh,t
¢
σh,t
+ µz.
Consider a job with zˆ = χ−1t
³
hˆ
´
. This job requires a worker with hˆ by definition
of χt (·). This means that if the maximization is characterized by the first- order
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condition, the following condition must be satisfied in the equilibrium:
w0t
³
hˆ
´
= υχ−1t
³
hˆ
´³
hˆ
´υ−1
=
υyˇt
³
hˆ
´
hˆ
,
where yˇt
³
hˆ
´
= y(χ−1t
³
hˆ
´
) = exp
n
µz + υµh,t +
³
σz+υσh,t
σh,t
´³
ln hˆ− µh,t
´o
. Because
the reservation wages of all workers are equal to zero and the choice of hˆ is arbitrary,
we can solve the wage function by integrating w0t (h) with respect to h:
wt
³
hˆ
´
=
Z hˆ
0
w0t (s) ds = LStyˇt(hˆ), (3)
where LSt =
υσh,t
σz+υσh,t
is the labor share in production. As this wage function guar-
antees that the problem (1) is a convex problem for the job with zˆ = χ−1t
³
hˆ
´
, the
first-order condition fully characterizes the job’s profit maximization problem. Hence
the derived χt (·) and wt (·) satisfy the static equilibrium conditions (1) and (2), which
proves the existence of the equilibrium.
We can derive the GDP of the economy, Yt, as follows:
Yt = E [zh
υ
t ] = E (z)E (h
υ
t )ASt, (4)
where E (z) = exp
³
µz +
σ2z
2
´
, E (hυt ) = exp
³
υµh,t +
υ2σ2h,t
2
´
and ASt = exp [υσzσh,t].
Note that GDP can be decomposed into three components: average productivity,
E (z), aggregate human capital E (hυt ) and the productivity gains from assignment,
ASt. Note that an increase in σh,t increases ASt. Because job-specific productivity
and the skill of workers are complementary to each other, the matching of highly
productive jobs and exceptionally high skill creates disproportional impacts on pro-
ductivity. As an increase in σh,t means that more extremely talented workers are
available, it increases the productivity gains from assignment. This is the mechanism
by which a private education system can increase aggregate productivity.
Note that if σz = 0, Y = E (z)E (Ht) and w (ht) = E (z)Ht, where Ht = hυt .
Hence, the result is equivalent to that of a linear production function with perfectly
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substitutable human capital Ht. This is the standard production function considered
in previous studies (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar 1992). It means that, without
the heterogeneity of jobs, there are no gains from assignment and aggregate human
capital can summarize all the impacts of human capital accumulation on GDP. In
the following section, we take σz = 0 as the benchmark case and investigate how the
results change when σz > 0.
Households: There is a continuum of overlapping-generation families i, the total
mass of which is also normalized to unity. In each period, each family consists of one
child, one young adult and one aged person. Each individual lives for three periods.
In the first period, children obtain an education while they are still supported by their
parents. In the second period, young individuals work, spend part of their income
on current consumption and the education of their children, and save the rest. In
the third period, old individuals consume their savings.
Human capital is formed according to individual ability ξit+1 (i.i.d. with mean
1), public education expenditure per pupil gt and private education expenditure per
pupil eit. Public education is financed by the proportional wage income tax: gt =
τ t
Z
w(hit)tdi where τ t ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate. The production function of human
capital is given by:
hit+1 = ξ
i
t+1
£
(eit)
θ(gt)
1−θ¤α , θ ∈ {0, 1} ,α ∈ (0, 1), (5)
where θ = 0 means a purely public education system and θ = 1 means a purely
private education system. This is a standard assumption in the literature (e.g.,
Glomm and Ravikumar 1992, Bénabou 1996, Fernandez and Rogerson 1998, and
Takii and Tanaka 2009). When θ ∈ {0, 1}, public education differs from private
education only in its financial system: the costs of education are financed by tuition
in the private education system and by taxes in the public education system. Hence,
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we can ignore technical differences that have nothing to do with the definition of
public education and private education.
The utility maximization problem of the young individual in household i is char-
acterized as follows. The young individual of household i chooses consumption when
young cy,it , his/her child’s private education expenditure e
i
t and consumption when
old co,it+1 to maximize his/her utility:
ln cy,it + βE(lnh
i
t+1) + γ ln c
o,i
t+1
subject to the budget constraint:
cy,it + e
i
t + b
i
t = (1− τ t)wt(hit), co,it+1 = Rt+1bit
and the production function of human capital (5), where Rt+1 is the gross market
interest rate and E(·) denotes the expectation operator.
From this utility maximization problem, we have the optimal private education
and savings for the young individual i at date t:
eit = λ(θ)(1− τ t)wt(hit), (6)
bit =
γ
1 + γ + αβθ
(1− τ t)wt(hit),
where λ(θ) = αβθ
1+γ+αβθ . Hence, each individual allocates constant fractions of his/her
own disposable income to each current and future period’s consumption, and the
private education of his/her child only under the private education system.
Stock Market: Let Bt denote total savings at date t, that is:
Bt =
γ
1 + γ + αβθ
LStYt.
The young individual invests all his/her savings in an index fund. The index consists
of all stocks issued by all the firms. The total return from the index fund at date t
10
is equal to the total dividend plus the value of the index fund at date t+ 1. As the
total savings must equal the value of the index fund at each period, the stock market
clearing condition implies that:
Rt+1Bt = Bt+1 +Πt+1,
where Πt+1 = (1−LSt+1)Yt+1 is the total profits earned by all jobs at date t+1, and
Rt+1 is the gross rate of return from the index fund. This market clearing condition
determines endogenously the gross rate of return Rt+1.
Choice of Tax Rate: Each young individual votes for a tax rate that maximizes
his/her lifetime utility.7 Following Takii and Tanaka (2009), we assume that when
voters choose their favorite tax rate, they take the future interest rate as given.8
7If the young individuals have the right to vote, then τ∗ is chosen by unanimity. Even if both
young and old individuals are enfranchised, τ t = τ∗ is chosen by a majority because τ∗ is always
supported by at least half of the population (that is, all the young individuals always support
τ t = τ∗). Moreover, our model and the results are fully robust to the presence of positive population
growth if job opportunities grow at the same rate and keep the same distribution. With positive
population growth, the young are a strict majority, and thus τ t = τ∗ is chosen in equilibrium even
if the old are also enfranchised.
8In principle, the choice of tax rate affects the next period’s interest rate through the aggregate
variables. Here, we assume that voters ignore this effect of tax choice. Some may wonder whether
this ignorance contradicts the assumption of rationality. However, to estimate the impact of tax on
the interest rate, a household must calculate how other households in the current generation respond
to the changes in the tax rate, how their responses change the distribution of human capital in the
future generation, how the changes in the distribution of human capital influence the future tax rate
that is voted on by future generations, and so on. These calculations allow a household to compute
the changes not only in current aggregate savings, but also in future aggregate savings and future
aggregate profits that determine the interest rate. We find that this process requires unreasonable
rationality from agents and it is realistic to assume that agents take the future interest rate as
given. Alternatively, we could assume a small open economy to derive our results without relying
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Hence, they vote for a tax rate that resolves the trade-off between the benefit from
and the tax burden for public education.
The objective function (that is, indirect lifetime utility) in the tax choice problem
of the young individual in family i is given by:
ln
∙
(1− τ t)w(hit)t − λ(θ)(1− τ t)wt(hit)−
γ
1 + γ + αβθ
(1− τ t)wt(hit)
¸
+βE
µ
ln
∙
ξit+1
µ
(λ(θ)(1− τ t)wt(hit))θ(τ t
Z
wt(h
i
t)di)
1−θ
¶α¸¶
+γ ln
∙
Rt+1
γ
1 + γ + αβθ
(1− τ t)wt(hit)
¸
.
The favorite tax rate of the household with labor income wt(hit) is given by:
τ ∗t =
(1− θ)αβ
1 + γ + αβ
≡ τ ∗(θ). (7)
Hence, τ ∗(θ) is chosen by unanimity.
3 Public vs. Private Education System in the Short
Run
In this section, we derive the dynamics of GDP and examine how a change in the ed-
ucation system influences GDP dynamics. It is shown that an increase in σ2z increases
the benefits from private education.
Substituting equations (3), (6) and (7) into equation (5), we can derive the fol-
lowing dynamics of human capital of the dynasty i.
lnhit+1 = αθ
µ
σz + υσh,t
σh,t
¶¡
lnhit − µh,t
¢
+ ln ξit+1
+α lnLSt + αθ
£
µz + υµh,t
¤
+ α(1− θ) lnYt + C (θ) ,
on this controversial assumption. This alternative assumption makes the interest rate constant and
therefore removes the effect of tax on the interest rate without changing our results.
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where C (θ) = ln
h
(λ(θ)(1− τ ∗(θ)))αθ (τ ∗(θ))α(1−θ)
i
. Assume that ability is i.i.d.
drawn from the log-normal distribution ln ξit+1 ∼ N(−σ2a/2,σ2a). Because lnhit ∼
N(µh,t,σ
2
h,t), the human capital of the next period is also log-normally distributed:
lnhit+1 ∼ N(µh,t+1,σ2h,t+1) where
µh,t+1 = αυµh,t+α ln
∙
υσh,t
σz + υσh,t
¸
+
α(1− θ) (σz + υσh,t)2
2
− σ
2
a
2
+αµz+lnC(θ), (8)
and
σ2h,t+1 = σ
2
a + α
2θ2 (σz + υσh,t)
2 . (9)
These two equations fully describe the dynamics of the distribution of lnht. Sub-
stituting equations (8) and (9) into equation (4), we can derive the dynamics of
the logarithm of GDP and the standard deviation of log income as functions of the
parameter of the education system θ.
Proposition 1 The dynamics of lnYt+1 and σw,t+1 can be given as functions of θ:
lnYt+1 = lnE (z) + lnE
£
hυt+1
¤
+ lnASt+1, (10)
lnE
£
hυt+1
¤
= αυ lnwet +HCt + C (θ) , (11)
lnwet = lnLSt + lnYt (12)
and
σw,t+1 = σz + υσh,t+1 = σz + υ
q
σ2a + α2θ
2σ2w,t, (13)
where
lnASt+1 = υσzσh,t+1 = υσz
q
σ2a + α2θ
2σ2w,t, (14)
lnHCt = −υ (1− υ)
σ2a
2
− αθυ(1− αθυ)
σ2w,t
2
, (15)
lnLSt = ln
µ
1− σz
σw,t
¶
. (16)
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Equation (10) shows that Yt+1 can be decomposed into average productivity E (z),
aggregate human capital E
£
hvt+1
¤
, and the productivity gains from assignment ASt+1.
Equation (11) shows that aggregate human capital is decomposed into the contribu-
tion of average labor income wet , the reduction in aggregate human capital because
of the heterogeneity of income and ability HCt, and other constants C (θ). Finally,
equation (12) shows that average labor income increases if either current GDP Yt or
labor share LSt increases. These three equations describe the dynamics of Yt given
the dynamics of σw,t. The dynamics of σw,t are determined solely by equation (13),
which shows that the variation of labor income depends not only on the variation of
human capital, but also on that of job-specific productivity.
The component HCt summarizes a reduction in aggregate human capital because
of the heterogeneity of income and ability. To guarantee the existence of a globally
stable stationary distribution, it is shown later that we must assume αυθ < 1. Given
this assumption, equation (15) shows that a rise in σw,t lowers the aggregate measure
of human capital E
£
hυt+1
¤
. This is the standard effect in previous studies: an increase
in inequality lowers aggregate human capital.
The novel part of this paper is summarized by the component ASt+1. It captures
the productivity gains from assignment. As argued before, a rise in σh,t+1 increases
this gain. Because a rise in σw,t increases σh,t+1, it might be possible that a rise in
inequality raises GDP in the next period.
Next, we identify the benefits and costs of an egalitarian education policy using
the dynamics derived above. To do so, we compare a purely public education system
(θ = 0) with a purely private education system (θ = 1), following the previous
literature such as Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998),
and Takii and Tanaka (2009).
Imagine an economy with the distribution of household income lnwt (hit) ∼ N(µw,t,σ2w,t).
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Suppose that the government of the economy is about to choose either the purely pri-
vate (θ = 1) or the purely public (θ = 0) education system. Starting from this
income distribution, the difference in the next period’s GDP under these two systems
is given by:
lnY Prit+1 − lnY Pubt+1 =
£
lnASPr it+1 − lnASPubt+1
¤
+
£
lnHCPr it − lnHCPubt
¤
= υσz
hq
σ2a + α2σ
2
w,t − σa
i
−
αυ (1− αυ)σ2w,t
2
, (17)
where XPubt and X
Pri
t are Xt under the public education system (θ = 0) and the
private education system (θ = 1), respectively. Note that as C (0) = C (1), C (θ) is
canceled out in equation (17).
The first term of this equation captures the productivity gains from assignment,
and the second term captures human capital loss because of heterogeneous income.
On the one hand, the productivity gains from assignment are always positive because
σh,t+1 is larger under the private education system. On the other hand, the private
education system always suffers from human capital loss, because income inequality
reduces aggregate human capital in the next period. Whether or not the private
education system increases GDP depends on the strength of these two opposite effects.
The following proposition is immediate from equation (17).
Proposition 2 The relative advantages of the private education system depend on
σz in the following sense.
1. When σz = 0, the public education system always generates larger GDP than
the private system does.
2. A rise in σz increases the relative advantages of the private education system:
d
¡
lnY Prit+1 − lnY Pubt+1
¢
dσz
= υ
hq
σ2a + α2σ
2
w,t − σa
i
> 0.
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3. The private education system attains higher GDP than the public system does
if:
σz ≥
α (1− αυ)σ2w,t
2
hq
σ2a + α2σ
2
w,t − σa
i .
Proposition 2 shows how the relative advantages of the private education system
change as σz becomes large. When σz = 0, as there is no variation in jobs, there
is no assignment problem. Hence, there are no productivity gains from assignment.
In this case, the public education system always dominates the private education
system. This is the standard result emphasized in previous studies.
When σz > 0, differences in education systems can influence the pattern of assign-
ment. This proposition shows that the advantage of the private education system
increases as σz increases. Note that a rise in σz increases the marginal productiv-
ity of highly talented people. As the private education system can provide more
talented people, a rise in σz increases productivity gains from the private education
system. This proposition also tells us that the productivity gains from assignment
can outweigh the human capital loss if σz is sufficiently large. Hence, if job opportu-
nities have large variations, an education policy may face a serious efficiency—equity
trade-off.
Compared with the impacts of σz, it is not clear how a rise in σ2w,t influences the
relative advantages of the private education system. On the one hand, it increases
human capital loss because of a rise in inequality. It makes equalizing income and
thus the public education system more beneficial. On the other hand, as a rise in σ2w,t
makes it likely to have more highly skilled workers, it also increases the productivity
gains from assignment. Taking the derivative with respect to σ2w,t in equation (17),
it is shown that:
d
¡
lnY Prit+1 − lnY Pubt+1
¢
dσ2w,t
> 0, iff σ2w,t <
σ2z
(1− αυ)2
− σ
2
a
α2
.
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If σ2w,t is small enough, a rise in inequality increases the relative advantages of a
private education system; if it is large enough, the opposite is true. The cutoff point
depends on σ2z. Note that if σ
2
z = 0, a rise in inequality always moves in favor of
the public education system. When σ2z = 0, there are no productivity gains from
assignment. Hence, equalizing income is always beneficial. However, when σ2z is
large, the demand for highly skilled labor is large, which makes private education
more beneficial.
This analysis suggests that certain results in this section may not be relevant for
the long run. As a rise in σz also increases σ2w,t+1, there are indirect effects that may
outweigh the direct effect. This is the theme in the next section.
4 Public vs. Private Education System in the Long
Run
In this section, we analyze how a rise in σz influences the relative advantages of
education systems when an aggregate economy reaches a steady state. The steady-
state level of σ2w,t is endogenously determined as a function of σz. Hence, it is not
clear how a rise in σz changes the impacts of changes in education systems on GDP
in the long run. First, we show that an aggregate economy converges to a unique
steady state. Later, we analyze how a rise in σz changes the relative advantages of a
private education system when the economy is in its steady state.
First, we prove that there is a globally stable stationary income distribution. Note
that both lnYt and σw,t converge to stationary points if and only if µh,t and σh,t in
equations (8) and (9) converge to stationary points. Assuming that αυ < 1, it is easy
to see that µh,t converges to a stationary point if σh,t converges to a stationary point.
Hence, by examining the convergence of σh,t, we can prove the following proposition.
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Its formal proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 3 Assume that αυθ < 1. The economy converges monotonically to a
unique and globally stable stationary income distribution.
When the economy reaches the stationary distribution, σw,t, which affects GDP,
is endogenously determined. The next proposition summarizes the dependent rela-
tionship of GDP on the exogenous parameters.
Proposition 4 The logarithm of the steady-state GDP is expressed by:
lnY ∗ =
1
1− αυ [lnE (z) + αυ lnLS
∗ + lnHC∗ + lnAS∗ + C (θ)] ,
where
lnAS∗ = υσz
q
σ2a + α2θ
2 (σ∗w)
2,
lnHC∗ = −υ (1− υ) σ
2
a
2
− αθυ(1− αθυ)(σ
∗
w)
2
2
,
lnLS∗ = ln
µ
1− σz
σ∗w
¶
,
and
σ∗w =
σz +
q
α2θ2υ2σ2z + (1− α2υ2θ2)υ2σ2a
1− α2υ2θ2
.
Similarly to the previous section, θ influences GDP through the productivity gains
from assignment AS∗, a reduction in aggregate human capital because of the hetero-
geneity of income and ability HC∗, and other constants C (θ).
However, a change in θ has an additional indirect effect. As it changes σ∗w, it also
changes the labor share LS∗. A rise in the variation of labor income σ∗w increases the
variation of skill at the stationary point σ∗h, which increases the rent from skill. To
understand the logic behind this argument, imagine what would happen if σ∗h = 0.
In this case, everybody has the same skill, and thus a firm can always find alternative
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workers. Therefore, the wage payments for all workers are at the reservation wage,
which is 0 by assumption, and a firm takes all the surplus. This mechanism is
equivalent to that of a Ricardian rent model. When workers have more variation in
skill, skilled workers receive more than the reservation wage because it is difficult to
find alternative workers. As the reservation wage does not change, unskilled workers
are still guaranteed to receive the reservation wages. This mechanism increases the
labor share. As an increase in the labor share increases the average labor income, it
raises the average amount of investment in human capital and, therefore, GDP.
Similarly to the previous section, we compare the productive impact of the purely
private education system (θ = 1) and the purely public education system (θ = 0):
ln (Y ∗)Pr i − ln (Y ∗)Pub (18)
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
αυ
h
ln (LS∗)Pr i − ln (LS∗)Pub
i
+
h
ln (AS∗)Pr i − ln (AS∗)Pub
i
+
h
ln (HC∗)Pr i − ln (HC∗)Pub
i
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
1− αυ ,
where
ln (LS∗)Pr i − ln (LS∗)Pub = ln(1− σz
(σ∗w)
Pr i
)− ln( υσa
σz + υσa
),
ln (AS∗)Pr i − ln (AS∗)Pub = σz
"r
(υσa)
2 + (αυ)2
h
(σ∗w)
Pr i
i2
− υσa
#
,
ln (HC∗)Pr i − ln (HC∗)Pub = −
αυ (1− αυ)
h
(σ∗w)
Pri
i2
2
,
(σ∗w)
Pr i =
σz +
q
(αυ)2 σ2z +
£
(1− (αυ)2
¤
(υσa)
2
1− (αυ)2
.
Note that C (θ) is canceled out in equation (18) for the same reason as in the previous
section.
Because a rise in σz increases (σ∗w)
Pr i, not only the productivity gains from assign-
ment ln (AS∗)Pr i− ln (AS∗)Pub but also human capital loss because of the variation of
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income
¯¯¯
ln (HC∗)Pr i − ln (HC∗)Pub
¯¯¯
increases. In addition, ln (LS∗)Pr i− ln (LS∗)Pub
is also influenced by σz and (σ∗w)
Pr i. These observations imply that
d(lnY Pr i−lnY Pub)
dσz
can be positive or negative, and thus there is no monotonic relationship. However,
we can provide the following weaker statement about the relationship between the
relative advantage of the public education system and the variations in jobs as in
Proposition 5 (the proof is in the appendix).
Proposition 5 There exist σz and σz (0 < σz ≤ σz <∞) such that: (i) if σz < σz,
lnY Pub > lnY Pr i; (ii) if σz < σz, lnY Pub < lnY Pr i.
This proposition says that if σz is large enough (small enough), productivity gains
from the private education system (the public education system) are larger. There-
fore, this proposition confirms the main messages of this paper: if job opportunities
have large variations, an education policy may face a serious efficiency—equity trade-
off.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper compared private and public education systems when the labor market
is characterized by positive assortative matching between the productivity of jobs
and skill. It pointed out that there is a neglected role for an education policy that
cannot be captured by a measure of aggregate human capital. More specifically, it
showed that private education can increase the productivity gains from assignment
by increasing the availability of highly educated people, and that if job opportunities
have large variations in productivity, an education policy may face a serious efficiency—
equity trade-off.
The results of the model must be interpreted with caution. We have no intention
of claiming that a private education system always increases gains from assignment.
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Of course, it depends on the structure of the production side. We selected Sattinger’s
(1979) assignment model as our production structure because it clarifies how an
education policy influences gains from assignment by changing the distribution of
human capital and how the novel mechanism changes the results in previous studies.
It is possible to develop a production structure for which a public education system
can improve gains from assignment. In the rest of paper, we speculated about
alternative specifications of the production structure to examine the robustness of
our results.
First, we presumed that productivity differs across jobs because there exist job-
specific resources. This creates Ricardian rent, which can be shared with assigned
workers. However, the advantage of a job might be the result of other factors such
as unnecessary regulation. If this is the case, skilled workers may be misallocated to
an unsuitable position, which may lower productivity. This reasoning suggests that
the relative advantages of a private education system may be lower when a market is
heavily distorted.
Second, we assumed that jobs are perfect substitutes in a firm . In fact, our as-
sumption of perfectly substitutable jobs is not as restrictive as it looks. Alternatively,
we could assume that a firm has the following production function and maximizes its
profits:
y (z) = z
∙Z 1
0
¡
hit
¢ψ
di
¸ υ
ψ
, ψ < 1, υ > 0. (19)
Workers are complementary to each other, but this production function derives ex-
actly the same results as those in this paper. In this case, a firm employs the same
quality of workers and segregation occurs across firms. The assumption of perfectly
substitutable jobs is made only for simplicity.
Of course, this does not mean that complementarity is unimportant. As em-
phasized by Bénabou (1996) and Takii and Tanaka (2009), if the firm faces a mo-
21
nopolistically competitive market, the complementarity among goods favors a more
homogeneous skill distribution. Hence, it is likely that the complementarity matters
in this context.
These arguments suggest that if we wish to identify from data how an education
policy influences the gains from assignment, we need to be careful not only about
the heterogeneity across jobs, but also about the source of the heterogeneities and
how heterogeneous factors interact. Incorporating these aspects into the model and
quantitatively assessing an education policy would be interesting future research.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: As αυ < 1 is guaranteed by the assumption, it is obvious
that equation (8) converges to the steady state if equation (9) converges to the steady
state. Hence, we only prove the convergence of equation (9). Define:
σh,t+1 =
£
σ2a + α
2θ2 (σz + υσh,t)
2¤1/2 ≡ f(σh,t).
Because f(σh,t) is continuous in σh,t and f(0) > 0, it is sufficient for the existence of
a steady state to show that limσh,t→∞ f
0(σh,t) < 1. In fact:
lim
σh,t→∞
f 0(σh,t) = lim
σh,t→∞
αυθ
s
α2θ2 (σz + υσh,t)
2
σ2a + α2θ
2 (σz + υσh,t)
2 = αυθ < 1.
Hence there exists at least one steady state σh,t (and thus a steady-state distribution
of income). For the uniqueness and stability of the steady state, note that:
f 0(σh,t) = αυθ
s
α2θ2 (σz + υσh,t)
2
σ2a + α2θ
2 (σz + υσh,t)
2 ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 5: Note that when σz = 0, lnY Pri − lnY Pub < 0. Because
lnY Pri − lnY Pub is continuous in σz, there must exist σz > 0 such that lnY Pri −
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lnY Pub < 0 for any σz ∈ [0,σz). Hence, it is enough to show that there exists σz <∞
such that lnY Pri − lnY Pub > 0 for any σz ∈ (σz,∞).
For the first term in equation (18), note that αυ
h
ln (LS∗)Pri − ln (LS∗)Pub
i
=
αυ
h
ln(1− σz
(σ∗w)
Pri )− ln( υσaσz+υσa )
i
> 0. This is because the steady-state standard de-
viation of income under the private system is always larger than that under the
public system, and because the labor share is increasing in the standard deviation of
income. This observation implies that lnY Pri − lnY Pub > 0 if the sum of the second
and the third terms in equation (18) is nonnegative:
h
ln (AS∗)Pri − ln (AS∗)Pub
i
+h
ln (HC∗)Pri − ln (HC∗)Pub
i
≥ 0.
Next, note that
h
ln (AS∗)Pri − ln (AS∗)Pub
i
+
h
ln (HC∗)Pri − ln (HC∗)Pub
i
≥ 0 if
and only if
h
(σ∗w)
Pri
i2
≤ σ¯w ≡
4σz
1− αυ
∙
σz
1− αυ −
σa
α
¸
. (20)
This observation comes from direct calculations. It implies that for a given σz, ifh
(σ∗w)
Pri
i2
≤ σw, then lnY Pri− lnY Pub > 0. Hence, defining eσz ≡ σzσa , we must show
that there exists a unique eσz ∈ (1−αυα ,∞) such that h(σ∗w)Prii2 ≤ σ¯w for any eσz ≥ eσz.
Then, for a given σa > 0, the threshold level of σz (σz in the proposition) is uniquely
given by σz =
³eσz´σa.
Consider the following function of eσz ∈ (1−αυα ,∞):
g (eσz) =
µ
1+υ
?
α2+(1−α2υ2) 1
(?σz)2
1−α2υ2
¶2
4
1−αυ
h
1
1−αυ −
1
α?σz
i .
Observe that g (eσz) = [(σ∗w)Pri]2σ2w for eσz ∈ (1−αυα ,∞). Hence, it is enough to show there
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exists a unique eσz ∈ (1−αυα ,∞) such that for any eσz > eσz, g (eσz) < 1. Note that
lim
?σz→∞
g (eσz) =
³
1+υ
√
α2
1−α2υ2
´2
4
1−αυ
£
1
1−αυ
¤ =
³
1+αυ
(1−αυ)(1+αυ)
´2
4
(1−αυ)2
=
(1+αυ)2
(1−αυ)2(1+αυ)2
4
(1−αυ)2
=
1
4
< 1,
and lim?σz→ 1−αυα +0 g (eσz) =∞. Because g (eσz) is continuous and strictly decreasing ineσz ∈ (1−αυα ,∞),there exists a unique threshold level of eσz, eσz ∈ (1−αυα ,∞) such that
g (eσz) < 1 for any eσz > eσz. This completes the proof.
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